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INTRODUCTION

The Immigration Act of 18911 established complete federal control over
immigration by placing all immigration authority in the Immigration Bureau
under the Secretary of the Treasury.2 This Act was the result of a recommendation by a 1889 joint congressional committee, which found that a large
portion of immigration problems was due to the division of authority between
the federal and state governments.' After the enactment of numerous other
acts and years of continuing concerns, Congress further consolidated
immigration authority in 1933, creating the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). 4 Over sixty years later, the INS continues to be burdened by
problems, and on September 30, 1997, a congressional committee recommended that it be disbanded.
I, myself, have experienced the problems of the INS first hand. I
recently married a Brazilian, and the immigration process proved to be a true
abomination. I recall contacting the "Ask INS" hotline to inquire whether
my then fianc6e would be able to attend the University of Florida pending
her adjustment to permanent resident. I spoke to nearly a half-dozen people,
beginning with the person who answered, and ending with a supervisor. I
never got the same answer twice, and some of the answers I did get were

1. 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
2.

SHARON MASANZ, HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

S. REP. No. 96-2, at 9 (1980).
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 41.
5. Out of Many, One: Commission on Immigration Reform Issues Final Report, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES (Federal Publications Inc. D.C.), Oct. 6, 1997, at 1509 [hereinafter
Final Report]; William Branigin, Immigration Panel Calls for "Americanization" Effort,

Oct. 1, 1997, at A18; Ruben Navarette, Jr., Proposal to Dismantle INS Draws
Mixed Reviews: Services Shouldn't Suffer, Hispanic Leaders Say, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 1,
1997, at A14. Shirley M. Hufstedler, former Education Secretary, headed the CIR. Branigin,
supra, at A18. In addition to the dismantling of the INS, the CIR made a number of other
recommendations. Final Report, supra, at 1510. The CIR urged an extensive re-engineering
of immigration management, including better recruitment, training, and use of fees. Id. at
1510-11. Furthermore, it called for improvement of the processes of naturalization and
admission of immigrants, as well as improved integration of immigrants into American culture.
Id. at 1511. The CIR suggested "giving orientation materials to legal immigrants upon
admission;.. . encouraging state governments to establish information clearinghouses in major
immigrant receiving communities; ... promoting public/private partnerships to orient and
assist immigrants in adapting;" and increasing the commitment to educating immigrants, with
a focus on English language skills. Id. It called upon Congress to change the focus of the
immigration debate from "a numbers game to ... weaving America's myriad cultures into a
WASH. POST,

national fabric." Jodi Wilgoren & Patrick J. McDonnell, Immigration Panel Urges Focus on

Unity, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at Al.
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blatantly wrong. The phone call ended when I asked if there were anyone
there who actually knew the regulations, and the INS officer hung up on me.
Another example involves work authorization for people on fianc6 visas.
According to someone 6 at the Jacksonville INS office, when a person comes
into the U.S. with a fianc6 visa, the officers at the airport are supposed to
stamp his or her papers with "work authorized." When my fianc6e arrived,
however, the officers refused to do so, and when asked, said that they did not
stamp the work authorization there. Subsequently, I returned to Jacksonville,
where the officer told me that officers in Miami and Orlando routinely refuse
to stamp the work authorization. The officer could give me no reason why.
To this day, I am still not certain whether the officers at the airport are
supposed to stamp the work authorization. The problem is that apparently
the INS is not sure either.
Since then, I have been working for an immigration law firm, and the
INS continues to baffle me. The officers routinely lose documents and make
absurd evidence requests. Not surprisingly, when I heard that a congressional
committee recommended the dismantling of the INS, I became interested.
I was curious to see the various opinions and proposed solutions. This note
will summarize the history of the INS and analyze its current problems and
the proposed solutions.
I.

HISTORY

Congress passed the first law aimed at controlling immigration in 1864. 7
However, the first law actually regulating immigration did not appear until
1882. 8 This Act was intended to prevent the admission of criminals, idiots,
lunatics, and immigrants who were likely to become public charges. 9 In
1888, a House select committee was appointed, and in 1889, a joint
congressional committee was established, both of which determined that
many of the immigration laws were being violated."°
Accordingly,
Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891.11
Concern over immigration continued despite federal control, and in 1903,

6. I have omitted the names of those INS officers from this note.
7. MASANZ, supra note 2, at 6 (citing 13 Stat. 385 (1864)).
8. Id. at 7. The statute was codified as 22 Stat. 214 (1882).
9. Id.; Joseph Minsky, Introductory Overview of Immigration Law and Practice:
Historical Background, C394 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 8 (1989). A similar law was enacted in 1885
against contract laborers, 23 Stat. 332, and was amended in 1887, 24 Stat. 414, giving the
Secretary of the Treasury the power to deport aliens who were in violation of these laws.
MASANZ, supra note 2, at 7.
10. MASANZ, supra note 2, at 8. Aliens excluded under the 1882 Act were still gaining
entry, the laws against contract-labor were being avoided, and immigration through Canada
was proving problematic. Id.
11. Id. at 9 (establishing federal control over the immigration process).
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the Commissioner-General of the Bureau of Immigration argued that
responsibilities within the Bureau were not adequately defined. 12 The
Immigration Bureau noted continuing problems in enforcement at the
Canadian and Mexican borders, lack of uniformity of naturalization, and an
increasing number of naturalization frauds. 3 In 1906, Congress added the
naturalization of aliens to the duties of the Bureau of Immigration, which
became the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. 14 In 1907, the
Commissioner-General further noted that the U.S. attorneys under the
Department of Justice (DOJ) were not equipped to adequately assess the large
number of cases. 15 In 1909, in an attempt to give the Bureau of Immigration more control, Congress transferred the field agents under the U.S.
attorneys to the Department of Commerce and Labor. 16 Four short years
7
later, however, the Department of Commerce and Labor was abolished.
The immigration Bureau was split into two bureaus," one for immigration
and the other for naturalization.1 9 Both bureaus were placed under the
newly formed Department of Labor (DOL). 20
Once again, in 1933, the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of
Naturalization were reconsolidated as the INS. 2 ' Shortly thereafter, in 1940,
the INS was transferred from the DOL to the DOJ.22 At this time, Congress
also created a Special Inspections Division 23 and the five-member Board of
Immigration Appeals. 24 In 1955, the INS restructured its internal organization, creating regional offices and eliminating a number of smaller
offices.25 In 1977, the INS began using the Houston Model Office program,

12. Id. at 12.
13. Id. at 13-14.
14. Id. at 14. The naturalization side of the Immigration Bureau did not come into being
until Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 596. MASANZ, supra note 2,
at 14. Before then, naturalization had been the role of the courts. Id.
15. MASANZ, supra note 2, at 15.
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. Two departments were created: the Department of Commerce and the Department
of Labor (DOL). Id.
18. Id. The combined functions of immigration and naturalization had lasted only seven
years.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 47. This was done in the interest of national security. Id. It was thought that
the DOJ would be able to exercise more effective control over immigration, as regards
criminal and subversive aliens. Id.
23. Id. at 48. This division was created to investigate crimes relating to registration under
the Alien Registration Act of 1940. Id.
24. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals was created from the Board of Review, which
had provided recommendations to the DOL regarding deportation cases. Id.
25. Id. at 70.
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in an attempt to streamline its processing of cases and organize its records.26
The INS has continued to restructure its organization 27 and Congress has
continued to pass
immigration reform legislation. 28 Nonetheless, the
29
problems persist.

III. CURRENT CRITICISMS AND PROBLEMS OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

A.

Overlapping of the INS Border Patrol and the Customs Service

The first problem found in the INS concerns the overlapping of the INS
Border Patrol and the Customs Service. "Customs. . . [agents] are generally
responsible for examining goods entering the country, while the [Border
Patrol is] responsible for examining people entering the country."3
Nonetheless, they tend to unnecessarily duplicate each other's functions.3
Both agencies will often run background checks on persons crossing the
border, question the contents of a vehicle, or inquire as to a person's
immigrant status. 32
Despite the fact that these two agencies work side by side, they do not
work together. 33 There is no cross-training between the two agencies, their
operations are planned separately, they report to different leaders, and there

26. Id. at 79.
27. Currently the INS consists of four regional offices, Northern, Eastern, Southern, and
Western, which have administrative responsibility for the district offices. Minsky, supra note
9, at 11. The district office is the basic operating unit of the INS, "where some applications
and petitions for immigration benefits are submitted, where enforcement action is taken, and
where exclusion or deportation proceedings are instituted." Id. "The district director is in
charge of the district office. Each district office has a legal staff whose members serve as
prosecutors in exclusion and deportation proceedings and are known as general attorneys or
trial attorneys." Id.
28. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA),
Pub. L. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-546; Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 3359.
29. Some argue that these problems result from the conflict between the ideals of the
United States and our practical concerns. James J.Orlow, America's Incoherent Immigration
Policy: Problems and Solutions, 36 U. MLAMI L. REv. 931 (1982). On the one hand, one
hopes that the United States would eliminate discrimination and embrace immigrants. Id. at
931-32. At the same time, however, people are concerned about the cost immigrants may lay
on the country and the effects of immigration on the job market. Id. at 932. Related to this
problem is a "service versus enforcement" conflict. 143 CONG. REC. H8164, H8164 (daily
ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Reyes). As such, the INS must somehow strive to
balance these duties. Id. "For all of its good intentions and willing personnel, the INS is
doomed to fail." Id.
30. Daniel W. Sutherland, The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy: The Achilles Heel of
Immigration Reform, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109, 128-29 (1996).
31. Id. at 129-31.
32. Id. at 129.
33. Id.
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is a strong rivalry between them.34 Such a structure wastes vast amounts
of personnel, equipment, and funding.35
B.

Uncoordinatedand Unplanned Enforcement Strategies

The Border Patrol is so unorganized, that an estimated three to four
million3 6 illegal immigrants currently live in the United States.37 The
Border Patrol is divided into twenty-one sectors.38 These sectors, however,
bear no relation to the investigative division of the INS, which is divided into
thirty-three districts. 39 Their boundaries often overlap, making the coordination of the two divisions inherently confusing and difficult. 4° Further
complicating the problem, the Border Patrol has taken upon itself much of
the investigative duties of the INS. 41 This change has resulted in decreased
patrol of the borders, 42 as well as decreased utility of the investigative
division. 3
The problem of illegal immigrants is also due in part to the strategy and
deployment of the Border Patrol. 4 For many years, the Border Patrol had
focused on the apprehension of aliens who were already across the border.45
In 1993, however, a new El Paso sector chief shifted that sector's focus to
preventioni 6 Agents flooded the border, literally creating a wall against
illegal immigrants. 4 The operation had dramatic success in the El Paso
sector; however, the Clinton Administration did not immediately implement
the same strategy in other sectors, and the decrease of illegal immigrants into

34. Id. The two agencies have gone so far as to each implement the use of drug-sniffing
dogs, trying to surpass each other in making the most drug arrests. Id.
35. Id. at 130.
36. Kentucky Republican, Harold Rogers estimates this number as being over five million.
Robert Pear, Panel Urges That Immigrants Become FurtherAmericanized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1997, at A20.
37. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 120. "By the middle of the 1980s, so many illegal
immigrants were living and working in this country that Congress unilaterally declared
approximately three million undocumented people to be legal residents." Id.
38. Id. at 121.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 122.
42. Id. "A General Accounting Office study found that between 1986 and 1990, although
the Border Patrol received substantial increases in resources, the amount of time Border Patrol
agents spent patrolling the border actually dropped by eleven percent." Id.
43. Id. "One study concluded that fifty-seven percent of an INS investigator's work does
not require any enforcement skills." Id.
44. Id. at 122-24 (explaining that it is a lack of a strategy for deployment of the patrols
that is the problem).
45. Id. at 123.
46. Id. This change was known as "Operation Hold the Line." Id.
47. Id. at 123.
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El Paso resulted in dramatic increases elsewhere.48
The government's reaction to illegal immigration has been to pour vast
numbers of Border Patrol agents into the field;49 but without any coherent
strategy, the dramatic influx of agents only further complicates the
problem.50 Inexperienced agents tend to cause border abuses and increase
the likelihood of violent confrontations. 5' Furthermore, Congress has never
received a report detailing the number of agents that could accomplish
effective border control.5 2
C. Lack of Communication and Consistency Among the Offices
The INS has been called "'a feudal state with each region, district, and
sector acting independently to give its own interpretation of the law.' ,51
The INS is divided into four regional offices, thirty-three districts, and
twenty-one border patrol sectors.54 So many divisions will almost certainly
cause a breakdown in communication.55
Identical cases filed at different offices often receive different respon56
ses.
INS officers are supposed to have handbooks to guide them in the
many changes in the laws and regulations,57 but these are typically out of
date and not of much use.58 As a result, most immigration officers do not
know what the current law is. 59 "U.S. immigration policy depends more on
the person you ask than on the rule of law." 6
A recent review of the INS quality control revealed that fifteen out of
twenty-three offices investigated were not in compliance with the new quality
control procedures. 6' Seven were only in partial compliance, leaving only

48. Id. at 124.
49. Id. at 122.
50. Id. at 125.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 122.
53. Id. at 116 (quoting Weston Kosova, The INS Mess: How Immigration Became a
Nightmare,NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1992, at 21, quoting Raymond Momboisse, INS General
Counsel, internal memorandum).
54. Minsky, supra note 9, at 11; Sutherland, supra note 30, at 121.
55. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 116-18. "Congress simply cannot assume that when it
passes a new law, the INS will implement it in a consistent and rational manner. The agency
must overcome its fragmented organizational structure and culture before it can effectively
enforce the nation's immigration laws." Id. at 118.
56. Id. at 116.
57. Id.
58. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 116.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. INS Draws Renewed Congressional Criticism over Naturalization Process, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES, May 5, 1997, at 744.
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one in total compliance. 62 These problems indicate the poor level of
communication and training in the INS.
D.

Duplication of INS Duties by the State Department

Often, visa petitions must first be filed with the INS. 63 If they are
approved, they are forwarded to the consulates where the visas will be
issued. 64 Rather than just issuing the visas, however, the consulates
essentially reprocess the visa petitions and make the final determination as
to whether the visas will be approved. 65 Thus, the State Department has
power over the INS, making visa processing by the INS superfluous.6 6
Like the Border Patrol/Customs problem, this duplication wastes vast
amounts of resources, personnel, and funds, and leads to inconsistent
results.67 Other countries, such as Canada and Australia, have immigration
agency personnel who work in their embassies.68 Under this type of system
the immigration agency remains the only authority deciding immigration
issues.69
E.

Interaction Between the INS and the DOL

U.S. companies must presently complete labor certification through the
DOL before a foreign worker can be brought into the country.7 ° Subsequent to certification, the employer must file another petition with the
INS.71
"At the present time, labor certification is a total failure. 72
Warren Leiden, Executive Director of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA), stated that "the Labor Department 'is an extremely
flawed agency that doesn't know what it's about.' ,73 Currently, labor

62. Id.
63. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 130.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 131.
69. Id.
70. Gene McNary, No Authority, No Accountability: Don't Abolish the INS, Make It an
Independent Agency, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Aug. 25, 1997, at 1288. A labor
certification is a process by which the DOL certifies that no U.S. workers are available to
perform the particular job to be filled by the foreign workers. Sutherland, supra note 30, at
134.
71.

Id.

72. McNary, supra note 70, at 1288.
73. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 134 (quoting Interview with Warren Leiden, Executive
Dir., AILA (Jan. 5, 1996)).
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certifications can cause delays of two years or more.74

Accordingly,

employers in urgent need of labor, for which there are no Americans
available, are unable to fill those positions.7 5
Furthermore, the rules are in a constant "state of flUX. ' 76 Sister
agencies to the DOL, the Employment and Training Administration's Office
of Alien Labor Certification, and the Employment Standards Administration's
Wage and Hour Division continually send inconsistent signals.77 Further
complicating this problem is the fact that in at least a few cases, the DOL
itself has "provided inconsistent technical advice. 78 The DOL admits to
inconsistent interpretation and application of its prevailing wage regulation.79

F. Placement of the INS Under the DOJ
Gene McNary, former Commissioner of the INS, describes the DOJ as
"10,000 lawyers and not one manager." 80 He argues that the DOJ does not
know or care anything about immigration, and accordingly, so long as the
INS is under the DOJ, its mission can never be accomplished. 8' McNary
feels that the DOJ's concern is only that the INS not cause any embarrassment.82 Nonetheless, the DOJ must approve every INS budget, goal,
etc., before INS can implement them.83
The historic character of the DOJ makes the placement of the INS under
it problematic. 84 The DOJ consists of agencies such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Bureau of
Prisons. These agencies focus on enforcement, while the INS, with the
exception of the Border Patrol, primarily focuses on service.86 This
enforcement-based mentality of the DOJ directly conflicts with that of

74. McNary, supra note 70, at 1288. Austin, Texas has the quickest time, taking 90-130
days. Department of Labor ProcessingTimes in Days: March 1997, 16 AILA MONTHLY 161,

164 (1997). Kansas City, Kansas takes the longest, 690-890 days. Id. On average, labor
certifications take at least one to one and a half years. Id.
75. See McNary, supra note 70, at 1288.
76. Mary E. Pivec, Observations on the Enforcement of the H-1B Labor Condition

Application Requirements, 71
77. Id.

INTERPRETER RELEASES,

May 27, 1994, at 705.

78. Labor Dept. Cracking Down on Alleged H-IB LCA Violators, 70

INTERPRETER

1993, at 1328.
79. See id. at 1326.
80. McNary, supra note 70, at 1286.
81. Id.

RELEASES, Oct. 8,

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 1282
Id.
Id.

86. Id.; see 143 CONG. REc. H8164.
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service.
G. FinancialMismanagement
Through its own negligence, the INS loses $23 million per year. 87 INS
budgets are based on the presumption that approximately one-third of its
finances will come from fees.88 The INS, however, rarely collects certain
types of fees.89 INS rules require that airlines and cruise lines charge a fee
to passengers who travel into the United States. 9° In turn, the airlines and
cruise lines are required to pay this money to the INS. 91 The INS, for some
92
reason, rarely tries to collect it.
Failure to collect bail bonds also costs the INS a large amount of
money.93 The DOJ quoted an actual amount of $38 million over a six-year
period. 94 Ninety percent of illegal immigrants do not appear for their
deportation hearings, thereby forfeiting their bonds.95 Again, as with the
airline and cruise line fees, the INS inexplicably fails to collect the forfeited
bonds from the bond agencies.96
H.

Patchwork Regulations

Since the first immigration laws were passed, multitudes of subsequent
laws have amended them. Yet, Congress has not promulgated a workable set
of rules to govern immigration.97 Accordingly, it has passed this task on
to the Attorney General, who ordinarily has enforced immigration law on a
case-by-case basis.98
Congress continues to enact reform legislation, intended to improve
immigration laws. Most recently, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (flRAIRA). 99 This
legislation has had a severe impact on immigrants, and all of the regulations
interpreting this law have yet to be promulgated. One example involves

87. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 127-28.
88. Id. at 127. Nonetheless, the INS was budgeted $3.1 billion this fiscal year. Editorial,
INS "Mission Overload" Not Fixed by Disbanding It, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, Aug.

6, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Promt File.
89. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 127.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 127-28.
93. ld. at 128.
94. Id.
95. Id. Hundreds of thousands of bail bonds are forfeited each year. Id.
96. Id.
97. Orlow, supra note 29, at 934.
98. Id.
99. Publ. L. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-546.
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Section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).'0
Congress enacted this section in 1994 primarily to allow immigrants in the
United States who had not been inspected to adjust their status to lawful
permanent residents.'' After the enactment of IRAIRA, lack of inspection
became a ground for inadmissibility. 10 2 Thus, at least in theory, those
immigrants are no longer eligible for adjustment'.

IV. PROPOSALS FOR INS

REFORM

Since its inception, the INS has been the focus of endless criticism,
inquiries, and investigations as to its efficiency and practices. 103 As a

100. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i) (1996).
101. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i); Section 245(i) was initially to expire on October 1 of
1997. Id. Nonetheless, it has been extended twice as Congress tries to decide whether to
keep it. Final Report, supra note 5, at 1513-14.
102. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i).
103. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 110. Over twenty-five commissions and congressional
oversight committees have proposed major reforms in the INS. Id. See generally Reviewing
the Status of Operations at the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 856 (1996);
Activities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 730 (1995). A recent scandal
involved the Krome Detention Facility and the Miami International Airport. McNary, supra
note 70, at 1284. The INS was accused of interfering with a congressional investigation when
prisoners were released just before the delegation arrived. Id.; see also Deception of a
CongressionalTask ForceDelegation to Miami Districtof the Immigration and Naturalization
Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 11 (1997). The INS also has been accused of inflating the
numbers of persons apprehended at the Tijuana-San Diego border (Operation Gatekeeper).
McNary, supra note 70, at 1284. This accusation comes in tandem with accusations that the
INS has failed to stop illegal immigration at the southwest border. Id. at 1285. On April 10,
1997, Congress held a hearing on the INS. INS Again Scorched at Hearings, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES, Apr. 14, 1997 at 598-99. The INS vas "scorched" over the Miami deception and
Operation Gatekeeper. Id. at 598-99. Furthermore, the INS recently naturalized 180,000
persons before fingerprint checks had been completed, of which 16,000 were found to have
criminal records. McNary, supra note 70, at 1284; see also INS Proposes New Reorganization, But Others Urge Complete Overhaul, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Aug. 4, 1997,
at 1176 [hereinafter Reorganization]. Incidents like these have prompted a great deal of
ridicule of U.S. citizenship policies, for example, in a recent Interpreter Release, a parody of
"Citizenship USA" appeared. Do You Want Fries with That Citizenship Application?, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES, Mar. 28, 1997, at 532. The parody labeled the new policy,
"McCitizenship USA" and discussed the incorporation of naturalization with the McDonald's
drive-thru lanes. Id. The chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee responsible
for the immigration service has said:
The I.N.S. is overloaded .... The agency has too much on its plate. It cannot

control our borders, process immigrants and safeguard U.S. citizenship. We've seen
tens of thousands of criminals granted the most precious benefit our country has to
offer: U.S. citizenship. We have over five million illegal aliens residing in the
United States ....
Pear supra note 36, at A20. "Hispanic groups have long been critical of the INS, claiming
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result, many different people and organizations have offered a number of
proposals to solve the INS' problems. These proposals include simple
internal reorganization, 4 making the INS an independent agency,'0 5
dividing it into two agencies," 6 and completely dismantling it.'0 7
A.

INS Proposalsfor Reorganization

In 1994, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner announced the latest INS
plan for reorganization.10 8 The INS reorganization plan consists of five
principles: "(1) strengthening the chain of command by enhancing the INS
regions and regional directors and the Office of Field Operations; (2)
enhancing managerial accountability and career development; (3) clarifying
roles and responsibilities ... ; (4) improving program development
capacities; and (5) consolidating policy development and review."' 9
Through this plan, the INS intends to increase the authority of the Regional
Directors and Offices, as well as that of the Chief of the Border Patrol."0
In addition, the plan would realign and integrate a number of offices."'
Two Associate Commissioners would report to the Office of the Executive
Commissioner.12 One would be in charge of enforcement, overseeing
investigations, removals, intelligence, detention, asset forfeiture, and law
enforcement.' "
The other would handle services such as inspections,
114
adjudications, naturalization, and other service related duties.
The INS would create the new Office of Policy and Programs from the

enforcement tactics often unfairly target U.S. citizens of Hispanic ancestry."

Gary Martin,

Hispanic Group Applauds Proposalto Dismantle INS, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 6, 1997, available

in LEXIS, Regnws Library, Fresno File.
104. Reorganization, supra note 103, at 1173-74.
105. McNary, supra note 70, at 1290.
106. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 133.
107. As Details on ProposedDismantling of INS Emerge, Reactions Vary, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES, Aug. 11, 1997, at 1213 [hereinafter Reactions Vary]; Reorganization, supra note
103, at 1175. There are a number of other less involved proposals not fully discussed in this
note. Among them, James J. Orlow, Director of the AILA, proposes the creation of an
ongoing task force called the Immigration Policy Research Institute (IPRI). Orlow, supra note
29, at 936. The IPRI would be an "independent, nonpartisan body, composed of scholars and
practitioners from a variety of disciplines who would discuss the problems confronting
American immigration policy and its implementation." Id. It would centralize data on
immigration and provide analysis thereof. Id. Accordingly, it could provide advice on INS
policy. Id. Orlow also suggests that the IPRI could serve as a school to train asylum officers
and immigration judges. Id.
108. Reorganization, supra note 103, at 1173.
109. Id. at 1174.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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two offices currently in existence, the Office of Programs and the Office of
Policy and Planning. "5 The reorganization would also realign the Program
Development units into border management, enforcement, service, status
verification, and information systems." 6
Making the INS an Independent Agency

B.

Gene McNary responded to recommendation that the INS be abolished,
by recommending that it instead be made an independent agency.' 1 7 He
refers to the proposed dismantling and parceling out of the INS as "a childlike tantrum." 118 He argues that Congress should eliminate the DOL and
DOJ interference in immigration matters." 9 In support of his proposal, he
cites the backlog of labor certifications at the DOL, 120 the lack of
management in the 22DOJ,' 2 ' and the DOJ composition as primarily an
enforcement agency.
Furthermore, McNary criticizes State Department interference with the
INS, citing an incident where the State Department prevented the INS from
building a fence along the border with Tijuana, on the grounds that it was
bad diplomacy. 23 He also contends that the State Department is basically
anti-immigration and thus, that Congress must divest it of its immigration
authority. 124 McNary125 admits, however, that the INS requires a new
management scheme.
C.

Dividing the INS into Two Agencies

Daniel W. Sutherland 126 argues that the INS must be divided into a
service agency and an enforcement agency. 27 He labels the service agency
the Federal Immigration Agency (FIA). 128 The FIA would perform all of
the immigration functions currently performed by the INS and the State
Department. 129 The FIA would have an office in each U.S. consulate in
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. McNary, supra note 70, at 1290.
118. Id. at 1288.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1286.
122. Id. at 1282.
123. Id. at 1285.
124. Id. at 1288.
125. Id.
126. Daniel Sutherland is a Legal Scholar with the Center for Equal Opportunity.
Sutherland, supra note 30, at 109 n.*.
127. Id. at 133.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 133-34.
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order to replace the State Department's immigration functions. 3 ° In
addition, the FIA would make the immigration
decisions currently handled
31
by the DOL, such as labor certification.'
Sutherland contends that by allowing the FIA to handle immigration
petitions from beginning to end, needless repetition by multiple agencies
would end, and tens of millions of dollars would be saved. 132 Furthermore,
33
it "would also produce a more fair and consistent immigration policy.'
He cites the Ascencio Commission's assertion that combining these functions
in one agency would "'provide the basis for developing a more professional
corps of officers and policymakers.' ,13 Sutherland argues that the FIA
would eliminate the "fiefdoms" currently in the INS and would improve
communication between offices. 135 The relationship between immigrants
and the FIA also would be better than that with the INS because the FIA
36
would not be involved in enforcement activities.1
The enforcement agency would be a Border Management Agency
(BMA), operated by the Customs Service. 137 This agency would replace
the Border Patrol and handle investigations, deportations, and inspections,
making Customs responsible for the control of people and goods entering the
country. 13
Integration of the Border Patrol and Customs
would save
139
taxpayers tens of millions of dollars and reduce overlap.
There are currently 6000 Customs inspectors and 4000 INS inspec14
tors.
The integration could vastly reduce the number of these
employees. '4' In addition, the integration would eliminate the animosity
and competition between Customs and INS inspectors. 42 Finally, Sutherland argues that the BMA would improve the morale of the immigration
officers because they would be able to transfer to the different branches of
143
border enforcement.

130. Id. at 134.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 134-35 (quoting COMM'N

FOR THE STUDY OF INT'L MIGRATION AND CO-OP.

ECONOMIC DEV., MIGRATION: AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE 30

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

(1990)).

Id. at 135.
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Id.
Id. at 136.
Id.

141. Id.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 137.
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D.

Proposalby the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform

The Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR) has expressed concern
over whether one agency can handle all of the tasks of an effective
immigration system.' 44 The CIR recommended breaking down the INS into
what it considers the four "core" immigration functions. 45 The first "core"
function is border and interior enforcement. 46 The CIR recommends the
creation of a Bureau of Immigration Enforcement under the DOJ to handle
this function. 47 The Bureau also would be responsible for detention and
prosecution of aliens. 48 Under this Bureau, responsibilities would be
divided among a new "Immigration Uniformed Service Branch," investigators, intelligence, an "Assets Forfeiture Unit," pre- and post-trial
probation officers, trial attorneys/prosecutors, and field offices. 14 9 The
Immigration Uniformed Service Branch would incorporate INS inspectors,
Border Patrol agents, and detention officers.' 50 The CIR believes that this
scenario would more closely resemble traditional law enforcement agencies. '
152
The next "core" function would include the adjudication of visas.
The State Department would control this function exclusively, by way of an
' 53
"Undersecretary for Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions."'
Under this agency, there would be three bureaus: a Bureau of Immigration
Affairs, a Bureau of Refugee Admissions and Asylum Affairs, and a Bureau
of Citizenship and Passport Affairs. '54 Since the State Department has
traditionally performed a part of this role in the past and has a strong
infrastructure, the CIR feels that the Department is well suited to the
task. 55 The CIR believes56 that such a change would lead to more effective
and efficient processing.
The third "core" function would involve all of the labor aspects of
immigration, which under the current system, are performed by both the DOL
and the INS. 15 7 The CIR's plan would place all functions such as the
144. Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1213.
145. Id.; see also Reorganization, supra note 103, at 1175.

146. Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1213.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Final Report, supra note 5, at 1510.

150. Id.
151. Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1213.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1214.
Id.
Final Report, supra note 5, at 1510.
Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1214.
Id.
Id.
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hiring of foreign workers and enforcement of immigration regulations at the
workplace under the DOL.' 58
The fourth "core" function involves the immigration appeal process.'5 9
The CIR recommends creating a new agency, the Agency for Immigration
Review, to hear all immigration appeals.' 6° Such an agency would replace
the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Board of Alien Labor Certification
Appeals.
V.

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS

A.

The INS Proposal

The INS reorganization plan does not propose any changes that would
adversely affect immigration.
Strengthening the chain of command,
enhancing managerial accountability, clarifying roles, etc. are sound goals
and would improve the overall efficiency of the INS. 6' This plan,
however, does not address the duplication of efforts both at the border and
in visa processing. 162 First, to improve efficiency, the government must
163
resolve the duplication of duties by the Border Patrol and Customs.
Secondly, in addition to being costly, the duplication of visa processing
efforts causes inconsistent results for immigrants.' 64 An immigrant may
receive an approved petition from the INS, only to have his or her visa
denied at the consulate.1 65 Moreover, the INS-proposed reorganization does
66
not specifically address the problems of interaction with the DOL.'
Without solving these problems, immigration in this country will continue to
be troubled. The INS plan may improve the INS, but not the U.S.
immigration process.
B.

Proposalfor an Independent Agency

Making the INS an independent agency presents some interesting
possibilities. If the INS were an independent agency, problems such as its
placement under the DOJ and interference by the State Department would be
eliminated. 167 In addition, if the INS took control of the labor aspects of

158. Id.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Reorganization, supra note 103, at 1174.
See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
Sutherland, supra note 30, at 130; see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
Sutherland, supra note 30, at 130; see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
Reorganization, supra note 103, at 1173-76.
See McNary, supra note 70, at 1286-89.
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immigration and completely subverted the State Department's role, it would
lead to a more cohesive and coherent immigration policy.168
This proposal itself, however, does not detail its specifics or indicate
whether the INS, as an independent agency, would be completely disconnected from the DOL and the State Department. Furthermore, as with the
INS proposed reorganization, this plan does not address the overlap of
functions at the border. 69 The INS would still have a vast number of
resources competing with Customs to do the same job.
Finally, making the INS an independent agency would present problems
in itself. For example, the INS would have to divert already overloaded and
unorganized resources to handle the labor determinations currently done by
the DOL. Currently, the INS is horribly mismanaged. 70 The INS must
remedy this problem before it takes on any further responsibilities.
C.

Proposalfor Two Agencies

The proposal of making the INS into two agencies, one for enforcement
and one for service, would solve the service versus enforcement dilemma. 17 1 In addition, it would eliminate the overlap between the INS and the
State Department, and between the Border Patrol and the Customs Service. 72 Placing the enforcement arm of the INS under the Customs
Service also would improve the efficiency of border enforcement and
decrease cost to the government.1
An immigration office located in the State Department, as opposed to
processing by consular officers, would eliminate the inconsistency between
INS and State Department visa adjudications. The immigration service
would be able to control the immigration process in its entirety. Under this
plan, however, the DOL appears to still be involved with the immigration
process. The plan does not provide for any improvement in labor certification processes. Also, it does not designate any kind of management
scheme for the immigration service. Nonetheless, absent these problems, the
plan seems fairly sound.

168. See id. at 1288.
169. See generally id. at 1281.
170. Sutherland, supra note 30, at 109.
171. Id. at 133-37. Such a proposal has been endorsed by Sen. Spencer Abraham (RMich.): " 'We should consider splitting the INS up into one enforcement agency and one
legal immigration agency to increase the efficiency of both.' " William Branigin, Bipartisan
Commission to Recommend End of INS, Dispersal of Its Functions, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,
1997, at A4 (quoting Spencer Abraham).
172. See Sutherland, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
173. Id. at 133-34.
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The CIR Proposal

The CIR proposal to dismantle the INS seems like an attempt to flee one
sinking boat for several others. Essentially, Congress blames the INS for all
immigration problems without considering any external factors. 7 4 The CIR
proposes to place all immigration functions in the State Department.' 75
This solution ignores the fact that the State Department is basically
disinterested in immigration and is at least as much a part of the problem as
the INS. 17 6 Furthermore, such a change would place a heavy burden on the
State Department and would pose problems in the management of immigration cases within the United States.
In addition, the CIR proposes to create a new independent agency to
control the border. 177 This proposition is presumably in response to the
service versus enforcement problem. 7 8 Nonetheless, this solution would
further exacerbate the problem of duplication of efforts at the border. The
government would expend a large amount of resources to create a completely
new agency that would echo79 the Customs Service. This solution would
simply rename the problem. 1
Finally, the CIR proposes to place all labor related immigration functions
in the DOL, 180 a provenly ineffective and inefficient agency, at least where
immigration matters are concerned.' 8' Here again, as with the State
Department, the DOL causes a major portion of the labor-related immigration
problems. It is in as much need for reform as the INS.
The only reasonable aspect of the CIR's proposal is the creation of the
independent review agency. 182 It does not seem to pose any great
problems; but then the current review system does not necessarily need to be
replaced. In short, the CIR plan, like so much of the legislative history of

174. McNary, supra note 70, at 1287.
175. Final Report, supra note 5, at 1510.

176. McNary, supra note 70, at 1288.
177. Final Report, supra note 5, at 1510 (Bureau for Immigration Enforcement).
178. Id. Cecilia Mufloz, of the National Council of La Raza, doubts whether the INS
" 'can be a service provider and an enforcer for the same group of people. However, it's not
clear that separating the functions is going to fix the fact that the service side of the INS has
traditionally gotten short shrift.' " Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1214 (quoting Cecilia
Mufioz). Ms. Mufioz also has expressed fear that the split may lead to more enforcement and
less service. Navarette, supra note 5, at A14.
179. This proposal has been attacked by a number of people and agencies. Mark Krikorian
of the Center for Immigrations Studies is quoted as having said, "It strikes me as something
of a gimmick." Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1214.
180. Id.

181. McNary, supra note 70, at 1288; see supra note 74 and accompanying text (regarding
DOL inefficiency).
182. Final Report, supra note 5, at 1510.
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immigration, tries to solve the problem by reshuffling it. 183 The plan
would not alleviate any of the immigration problems; only displace them.
Accordingly, Congress should not implement it.184
VI.

RECOMMENDATION

As one might expect, the best solution is often a medley of various
proposals. None of the proposed solutions solves the overall problem;
although the two-agency solution comes fairly close. Nonetheless, a
combination of some of those ideas could very likely remedy the problem.
First, the overlap between the INS and the State Department, as well as
that between the INS and the Border Patrol, must be eliminated. In this
respect, one could follow the two-agency plan. The Border Patrol should
come under the management of the Customs Service. Accordingly, it would
eliminate the dual effort and reduce the INS budget without significantly
increasing the Customs Service's budget. It also would eliminate the
competition between Customs and the Border Patrol.
Next, the INS must place offices in the various consulates around the
world and eliminate the State Department's role in immigration. As such, the
INS would handle the immigration process from start to finish. This action
would once again eliminate dual effort while increasing the consistency of
visa adjudications.
Finally, the DOL is not capable of handling immigration by itself, and
the INS is not capable of making labor determinations by itself. Accordingly, the interaction between the DOL and the INS needs serious
improvement. The two agencies must rework their management and clarify
regulations for their staffs. In addition, the DOL must drastically reduce the
time it requires for labor determinations. Although this last proposition may
prove difficult, it is the key to ameliorating labor-related immigration
problems.
There remains, however, one issue that none of the proposals has really
addressed: the patchwork set of immigration laws that Congress continues to
promulgate. Current immigration laws contain numerous inconsistencies and
vagaries. The regulations are so complicated that most immigration officers
do not even know what the law is. As such, Congress should essentially start
over. Rather than constantly revising current law, a committee could rewrite

183. Demitrios Papademetriou, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, stated that the proposal would "'send an orphan agency from one
department to another.'" Reactions Vary, supra note 107, at 1214 (quoting Demitrios
Papademetriou).
184. Subsequent to the completion of this Note, the Clinton Administration has chosen not
to follow the CIR proposal. Eric Schmitt, White House Will Reject Advice to Abolish
Immigration Service, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1998, at A14.
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the entire immigration section of the Federal Statutes. Once this was done,
Congress could repeal the previous laws and enact new, consistent and clear
ones. With new, clear, and coherent laws, immigration officers could easily
learn the regulations without the worry that they could change the next week.
Not only would this improve immigration service, it also would improve the
interaction between the DOL and the INS.

I•

VII.

CONCLUSION

Congress should not dismantle the INS. The CIR recommendation is
misplaced. For the first time in its history the United States should make a
comprehensive effort to create an effective immigration service, rather than
merely reshuffling the problems. The INS needs some reorganization, but it
is not a sinking ship. Reform is feasible and desperately needed, but
Congress must act accordingly and face the problem.
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